In 1948 Henry A. Wallace ran for president on a third-party ticket. Fired from the Truman cabinet in 1946, he emerged as a strong critic of the administration's foreign policy. He was particularly dissatisfied with what he saw as an unjustified "get-tough-with-Russia" approach and ultimately opted for the third-party route. The Cold War was well under way by that time and intensified in 1948 with a Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade. Wallace's crusade, despite initial optimism, ended disastrously with his ticket receiving only 2.4 percent of the popular vote. The candidate himself was discredited and his supporters isolated from the mainstream of American politics. Thomas W. Devine's well-researched though somewhat narrowly focused account adds significantly to our understanding of this episode.
One of the strengths of Devine's book is its discussion of the Communist movement from the closing months of World War II through 1948. He shows that although American Communists wanted to follow a line laid down in Moscow, they misread Kremlin intentions. It was widely assumed, then and later, that the genesis for Wallace's thirdparty campaign was a Moscow directive. Yet Devine has found no evidence to support that idea. At the same time as the American party debated whether it should try to work within the Democratic Party or encourage a third-party insurgency, "Popular Front" or left-wing liberals who backed Wallace were engaged in the same kind of debate. Ultimately, the Communist Party and many of Wallace's followers came to the same conclusion: Run Wallace as a third-party candidate.
Earlier book-length accounts of the 1948 campaign have minimized the importance of Communist involvement in this effort. Devine, on the other hand, stresses such involvement; in fact, it seems to be his major concern. Key figures in the campaign, including its campaign manager, Calvin "Beanie" Baldwin, were Communists or close to the party, and Wallace often was unaware of that fact.
While Devine thought it important to trace the development of American Communist positions in that era, he was less interested in the course of Popular Front liberalism and why so many liberals had become estranged from the Truman administration. A closer look at that topic would show widespread liberal frustration with a foreign policy that seemed to line up with British interests, especially in the eastern Mediterranean, when the United States opted for the Truman Doctrine in early 1947. Devine stresses Popular Front opposition to the Marshall Plan but overlooks earlier liberal concerns with the interventionism of the Greek-Turkish military and economic aid program. U.S. intervention in the Greek civil war was a major departure and a big first step to subsequent interventions that ultimately led to the establishment of U.S. bases around the world.
Wallace was a poor presidential candidate, to be sure, and Devine's account emphasizes his missteps and the role of Communists in the campaign. Yet, as he shows Wallace's ineptness as a campaigner, Truman's record gets little attention. At one point, arguing that the Wallace effort had little influence on Truman's campaign, Devine writes, "The evidence suggests that by July Truman's top political advisers were committed to a forthright stance on civil rights" (124). What is missing here is what happened at the Democratic convention in July. Liberals led by Hubert Humphrey forced through a strong civil rights plank over a bland version the administration favored. Then, in late July, at the very time the third-party convention was being held, Truman issued an executive order to desegregate the armed forces. Truman would make a real (and ultimately successful) effort to attract the black vote, speaking in Harlem at the end of the campaign. Wallace, on the other hand, took his campaign into the Deep South, refusing to speak to segregated gatherings and denouncing Jim Crow. His efforts in the South helped dramatize the civil rights issue. Devine shares that view and credits Wallace with drawing attention to Jim Crow as a moral issue.
In some respects, Henry Wallace's 1948 Presidential Campaign and the Future of Postwar Liberalism is a critique of historians who have seen postwar Popular Front liberalism as a positive force in American politics. To its author's mind, those historians "romanticize Popular Front liberalism, exaggerate its real and potential influence in postwar politics, and largely misunderstand the motives and goals of anticommunist liberals" (xiii). There is some merit to that comment, yet many of those same historians have furthered our understanding of postwar liberalism, including its efforts in the areas of civil rights, civil liberties, and organized labor.
The Wallace campaign marked the end of an era in American liberalism and the Left. Between 1945 and 1948, a sizeable number of liberals thought there were possibilities to build upon the New Deal, promote social justice, and work out an accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union. Other liberals shared some of the same goals but were unwilling to work with Communists and saw the Soviet Union as a threat to the United States and peace. Ultimately, as Devine and others have shown, that perspective would prevail. Food co-ops can be seen as a tangible manifestation of the cultural nexus where interest in food and nutrition, the co-operative tradition, and the desire for participatory democracy and community formation all meet. As such, it is no small or insignificant topic. In Food Co-ops in America, Anne Meis Knupfer offers a fresh look at a part of the co-op
